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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE 
REGULATORY SYSTEM:           
MANUFACTURING UNCERTAINTY              
AND THE DEMISE OF THE FORMAL 
REGULATORY SYSTEM 
David Michaels, M.P.H., Ph.D. & Celeste Monforton, M.P.H.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Polluters and manufacturers of dangerous products have waged 
sophisticated campaigns to manufacture uncertainty about the 
scientific evidence used to support public health protection and 
victim compensation.1 As a result, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) has virtually ceased issuing 
regulations that would limit potential exposure to causes of disease 
or other workplace hazards, even in the face of compelling 
scientific evidence. Unfortunately, following the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
                                                          
 * David Michaels, PhD, MPH, is Research Professor and Associate 
Chairman, Department of Environmental and Occupational Health at The 
George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services. 
Celeste Monforton, MPH, is a Research Associate in the Department of 
Environmental and Occupational Health at The George Washington University 
School of Public Health and Health Services. This work was supported by the 
Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP). The authors 
appreciate the helpful comments provided by Eula Bingham, David Vladeck, 
and the members of the SKAPP planning committee. Major support for SKAPP 
is provided by the Common Benefit Trust, a fund established pursuant to a court 
order in the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation. 
1 A tobacco industry executive once said “doubt is our product.” Brown & 
Williamson, Smoking and Health Proposal, Doc. No. 332506, at 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/bw/332506.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2004). 
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which requires federal judges to act as gatekeepers of expert 
testimony, courts have also become the targets of such campaigns.2 
Given the demise of OSHA’s regulatory activities, litigation 
initiated by injured workers is likely to play an increasingly 
important role in eliminating or reducing workplace hazards, and 
therefore in preventing occupational illness and death. This article 
examines the responses of the legal and regulatory systems to 
workplace hazards, and explores the impact of litigation and 
regulation on the prevention of work-related disease in the United 
States. 
I. POPCORN LUNG 
In March 2004, Eric Peoples, a 32-year-old former employee 
of a microwave popcorn factory, sued International Flavors, the 
manufacturer of the butter flavoring used in his employer’s plant, 
and was awarded $20 million by a jury in Joplin, Missouri.3 Mr. 
Peoples, a nonsmoker, had developed bronchiolitis obliterans, a 
rare and devastating lung disease characterized by an obliteration 
of the pulmonary airways.4 Mr. Peoples is presently awaiting a 
lung transplant.5 Statistics suggest that, if a successful transplant is 
accomplished, Mr. Peoples can expect to live an additional ten 
years.6 
Mr. Peoples is not alone in his diagnosis with this rare disease. 
Thirty cases of bronchiolitis obliterans have been documented 
                                                          
2 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
3 E & C Peoples v. Int’l Flavors, No. 01CV683025-07 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar. 
15, 2004). 
4 Bronchiolitis Obliterans is a “disease in which the bronchioles and 
occasionally some of the smaller bronchi are partly or completely obliterated by 
nodular masses which contain granulation and fibrotic tissue.” TABER’S 
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 272 (17th ed. 1993). 
5 Sara Shipley, Study Showed Chemical was Toxic, ST. LOUIS POST 
DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 2004, at C1. See also CBSNEWS.com, Jury Gives Popcorn 
Worker $20M (Mar. 16, 2004), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 
2004/03/16/heatlh/main606532.shtml. 
6 Connie Farrow, Victim of Lung Disease is Awarded $20 Million, ST. 
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 2004, at A1. 
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among workers employed at microwave popcorn factories.7 The 
lungs of eight workers from one plant were damaged severely 
enough to make them candidates for lung transplantation.8 Many of 
these workers are young nonsmokers.9 
In early 2000, an occupational medicine physician in Kansas 
City, Missouri, contacted the Missouri Department of Health 
(MDOH) to report cases of bronchiolitis obliterans among workers 
at the popcorn plant in Joplin where Mr. Peoples was employed.10 
In turn, officials from MDOH reported the outbreak to both the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to 
compel an investigation into the cause of the rare disease 
outbreak.11 NIOSH scientists subsequently visited the factory and 
conducted medical evaluations of the workers.12 In September 
2001, NIOSH reported its preliminary results and distributed an 
information sheet to the factory’s workers.13 The sheet contained 
the following statement: “There is a work-related cause of lung 
disease in this plant. We at NIOSH believe the problem is 
continuing even after the company made changes that we 
                                                          
7 NIOSH Report Examines Investigation of Popcorn Plant Workers and 
Lung Disease, Daily Labor Report (BNA) (Apr. 26, 2002), at 
http://www.bna.com/products/labor/ dlr.htm; see also Shipley, supra note 5. 
8 Shipley, supra note 5, at C1. 
9 See Sara Shipley, Snack Food: Is It Hurting Workers Who Make It?, ST. 
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Apr. 4, 2004, at A1; NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL 
SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT 
NO. DHHS 2004-110, NIOSH ALERT: PREVENTING LUNG DISEASE IN WORKERS 
WHO USE OR MAKE FLAVORINGS 3-4 (2003) [hereinafter NIOSH ALERT: 
PREVENTING LUNG DISEASE IN WORKERS WHO USE OR MAKE FLAVORINGS]. 
10 NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, INTERIM REPORT NO. HETA #2000-0401, 
NIOSH INVESTIGATION OF GILSTER MARY LEE 4 (2001) [hereinafter NIOSH 
INVESTIGATION OF GILSTER MARY LEE]. 
11 See Shipley, supra note 9, at A1. 
12 NIOSH INVESTIGATION OF GILSTER MARY LEE, supra note 10. 
13 NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, IMPORTANT WORKER HEALTH NOTICE ABOUT 
THE POPCORN PLANT IN JASPER, MISSOURI (2001). 
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recommended.”14 
In 2001, NIOSH also conducted a study in which rats were 
exposed to airborne concentrations of butter flavoring for a single 
six-hour period.15 The NIOSH researchers reported lung damage 
among the rats exposed to vapors containing 285 to 371 parts per 
million (ppm) of diacetyl, the chemical that is the primary 
component of the butter flavoring.16 The study’s lead investigator, 
Dr. Ann Hubbs, reported that these findings were “the most 
dramatic case of cell death ever seen”17 in this type of experiment. 
In their 2002 report, the NIOSH researchers explained that the 
diacetyl levels to which they had exposed the rats were “not 
extraordinary when compared with levels measured in the 
workplace.”18 
When NIOSH undertook its animal study, the agency did not 
know that BASF, the German chemical manufacturer, had 
conducted a similar study using pure diacetyl in 1993.19 That 
study, which was never reported to the U.S. government or 
published in scientific literature, found results very similar to those 
of NIOSH; one four-hour period of exposure to diacetyl resulted in 
an “abundance of symptoms indicative of respiratory tract 
                                                          
14 Id. 
15 A.F. Hubbs et al., Necrosis of Nasal and Airway Epithelium in Rats 
Inhaling Vapors of Artificial Butter Flavoring, 185 TOXICOLOGY & APPLIED 
PHARMACOLOGY 128, 129 (2002). 
16 NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT NO. HETA #2002-0408-2915, NIOSH 
HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION REPORT: AGRILINK FOODS POPCORN PLANT 11 
(2003). 
17 Shipley, supra note 5, at C1. 
18 Hubbs, supra note 15, at 128-35. The investigators reported that “[a] 
concentration of about 200 ppm was measured inside a vat that contained butter 
flavoring mixed with oil and salt.” Id. at 134. However, because the 
investigation occurred after local exhaust ventilation had been installed for the 
tanks, “previous concentrations were probably higher.” Id. Both the testimony 
about NIOSH’s investigation at the factory and the results of the animal 
experiments conducted by the agency’s scientists were presented to the jury in 
Mr. Peoples’ case. 
19 Personal conversation with Kay Kriess, MD, National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (Nov. 2, 2004). 
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injury.”20 
According to American government scientists, there is little 
question that the Joplin workers developed bronchiolitis obliterans 
as a result of their work in the popcorn factory.21 The manufacturer 
of the butter flavoring, however, has refused to acknowledge a 
connection between the exposure of workers to the butter flavoring 
and the development of the lung condition. At a second trial 
involving one of the lung-damaged workers, the defendant’s 
toxicologist testified that there was insufficient evidence to 
conclude that the lung disease in the popcorn workers was caused 
by butter flavoring.22 
II. OSHA: RESPONSE OR RETREAT? 
Outbreaks of work-related disease and death helped fuel the 
passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) in 
1970.23 In congressional hearings, workers and scientists described 
numerous outbreaks of work-related disease with regard to which 
no action was taken until a sufficiently large number of workers 
had died.24 Tony Mazzocchi, a labor leader and forceful advocate 
for the OSH Act, called this “the body in the morgue approach.”25 
In order to prevent future work-related epidemics, Congress 
created OSHA and authorized the agency to develop standards 
                                                          
20 BASF, INC., REPORT: STUDY ON THE ACUTE INHALATION TOXICITY 
LC50 OF DIACETYL FCC AS A VAPOR IN RATS 4-HOUR EXPOSURE, PROJECT NO. 
1310247/927010 (1993) [hereinafter BASF REPORT]. 
21 Kay Kreiss et al., Clinical Bronchiolitis Obliterans in Workers at a 
Microwave-Popcorn Plant, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 330, 330-38 (2002). 
22 Testimony Ends in Second Trial on Claim that Popcorn Flavoring 
Caused Injury, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 30, 2004. 
23 Occupational Safety & Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq. 
(1970). 
24 JOSEPH A. PAGE & MARY-WIN O’BRIEN, BITTER WAGES: RALPH 
NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON DISEASE AND INJURY ON THE JOB 165-66 
(1973). 
25 Rafael Moure-Eraso, Primary Prevention and Precaution in Hazard 
Identification in the NIEHS/NTP: Body in the Morgue Approach, 117 PUB. 
HEALTH REP. 564, 564-73 (Nov.-Dec. 2002), available at http://www. 
publichealthreports.org/userfiles/117_6/117564.pdf. 
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based on the best scientific evidence available.26 Congress afforded 
the agency a great deal of leeway in identifying hazards and setting 
protective exposure limits to enable the agency to act before large 
numbers of individuals became sick.27 
OSHA was first made aware of the risk of lung disease among 
popcorn workers in May 2000.28 OSHA’s Kansas City Area Office 
received a letter from the Missouri Department of Health (MDOH) 
that alerted the agency to a serious and potentially deadly health 
hazard confronting workers at the factory that employed Mr. 
Peoples.29 The letter indicated that ten workers from one 
microwave popcorn-packaging facility had been diagnosed with 
bronchiolitis obliterans and that three of these workers were 
awaiting lung transplants.30 Another twenty to thirty workers had 
less severe, but still notable respiratory symptoms. The MDOH 
reported that it planned to conduct an epidemiologic investigation 
of the disease cluster, but notified OSHA that obtaining medical 
releases and physician reports would take some time.31 
Consequently, the MDOH asked OSHA to inspect the facility, 
noting that “[a]s a regulatory agency . . . [OSHA] can more 
promptly address this situation, and if there is an obvious hazard to 
workers, address it quickly.”32 
A few days later, an OSHA inspector visited the microwave 
popcorn-packaging plant. According to the inspector’s notes, the 
company had become “concerned that there might be some 
environmental problem at their facility so they had their insurance 
carrier Wausau come into their plant and conduct environmental 
sampling for total nuisance dust.”33 The records provided to OSHA 
                                                          
26 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655 
(2004) [hereinafter OSHA Act]. 
27 Id.; See PAGE & O’BRIEN, supra note 24. 
28 Letter from Daryl W. Roberts, Director, Section for Environmental and 
Public Health, Missouri Department of Health, to Matt Gaines, Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (May 19, 2000) (on file with authors). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety and Heath, Inspection Report, Report 
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by the company indicated that the insurance carrier had taken the 
air samples four years earlier in 1996.34 The OSHA inspector 
performed no additional dust sampling and offered his 
“professional opinion that it would be ludicrous to re-sample the 
area again.”35 
The inspector did, however, collect samples of respirable oil 
mist and send them to OSHA’s laboratory, only to have them 
discarded because the agency’s sampling method applied only to 
petroleum-based oils, not vegetable oil.36 Having failed to collect 
usable exposure samples, the inspector, according to his own notes, 
“determined the company to be in compliance and closed out the 
case file since there were no other OSHA sampling protocols at his 
disposal to test further at the plant.”37 Sixteen months later, in 
September 2001, an attorney representing several of the ill workers 
filed a complaint with OSHA and followed up with another 
complaint in December 2001.38 In her letter to the agency, the 
attorney alleged that not enough had been done to improve 
ventilation in the plant, as evidenced by the fact that “one 
employee lost half of his lung capacity working in the plant after 
                                                          
ID 0728500, Inspection Number 303206387, Health Narrative: CSHO 
Workplace Findings (May 23, 2000) (on file with authors) [hereinafter CSHO 
Inspection Report]. The report was obtained through a Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) request. Portions of the inspector’s notes were redacted. 
34 Letter from Mike Freshwater, CIH, Senior Environmental Health 
Engineer, WAUSAU, to Jim Cook, Jasper Foods, Inc. (May 10, 1996) (on file 
with authors). 
35 See CSHO Inspection Report, supra note 33. 
36 Id. The document states: 
The CSHO [compliance safety and health officer] got a telephone call 
from the lab indicating that they would be unable to analyze his oil mist 
samples. They said that the OSHA sampling method for oil mist 
pertained only to oil mist particulate off gassed from petroleum based 
oils and not vegetable food grade oils. They said they were unable to 
use the CSHO’s oil mist samples at all. 
Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Letter from Amy R. Powell, Humphrey, Farrington, McClain & Edgar, 
P.C., to Rick Roberts, OSHA Kansas City Area Office (Dec. 19, 2001) (on file 
with authors). 
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the remedial measures” were taken.39 
Following the agency’s receipt of the attorney’s letters, a 
second OSHA inspector visited the plant on December 20, 2001 
for only forty minutes.40 According to the inspector’s notes, he did 
not conduct an inspection.41 OSHA subsequently sent a letter to the 
attorney who had filed the complaints denying the need for further 
investigation at the plant. 42 OSHA explained: 
[T]he hazard which you brought to our attention has been 
corrected and . . . Glister [sic] Mary Lee is complying with 
the recommendations of NIOSH . . . . The hazard does not 
fall within OSHA’s jurisdiction because there is [sic] no 
Permissible Exposure Limits for the food blend chemicals 
of concern that are used at the factory.43 
A. OSHA 101 
In situations in which there is an obvious workplace hazard but 
no applicable OSHA standard, OSHA inspectors often cite to what 
is commonly referred to as “the general duty clause,” which 
outlines the obligation of employers to provide employees a place 
of employment that is free from recognized hazards that cause or 
                                                          
39 Id. Ms. Powell complained: “Although NIOSH has been investigating 
the plant and certain measures have been taken to improve the ventilation . . . 
these measures were not enough . . . .” Id. 
40 Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety and Health, Inspection Report 
(OSHA-1), Report ID # 0728500, Inspection # 3043064083 (noting the 
inspector’s entry time at the facility as 16:00 hours, opening conference with the 
employer at 16:10 hours and closing conference at 16:50 hours) (on file with 
authors). 
41 Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety and Health, Complaint/Inspection 
Case File Activity Diary, Kansas City Area Office, Complaint # 203783865, 
Inspection # 304306483 (including a handwritten note indicating “NIOSH was 
on site and conducting 18 month investigation for health hazard and ee 
[employee] exposures . . . closed complaint. No inspection & send “A” letter to 
comp [company]”) (on file with authors). 
42 See Letter from Manuel Olmedo, OSHA Area Director, to Amy R. 
Powell, Humphrey, Farrington, McClain & Edgar, P.C. (Feb. 28, 2002) (on file 
with authors). 
43 Id. 
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are likely to cause death or serious physical harm.44 Although the 
OSH Act provides OSHA with the authority to cite companies for 
failing to comply with the general duty clause and courts have 
confirmed this authority in the context of judicial decisions,45 in 
recent years agency officials have been reluctant to invoke the 
clause. In the case of the popcorn workers, OSHA’s position is that 
hazards for which there is no applicable OSHA standard do “not 
fall within OSHA’s jurisdiction.”46 With dozens of workers 
suffering from serious lung disease, the popcorn factory hazard 
would appear to be a logical candidate for an OSHA regulation.47 
To initiate the regulatory process, OSHA is required to make a 
determination that the proposed regulation would reduce or 
eliminate a “significant risk” for workers exposed to the hazard.48 
In the decision that established this requirement, the U.S. 
Supreme Court noted that the risk must be “quantified sufficiently 
to enable the Secretary [of Labor] to characterize it as significant 
in an understandable way.”49 In an effort to meet this mandate, 
OSHA has invested significant time and resources in preparing 
detailed quantitative risk assessments for its health standards.50 
Many of OSHA’s health standards regulate the exposure of 
workers to carcinogens.51 Estimating the cancer risk associated 
                                                          
44 OSHA Act § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2004). 
45 See, e.g., Int’l Union v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
46 Letter from Manuel Olmedo to Amy R. Powell, supra note 42. 
47 See NIOSH ALERT: PREVENTING LUNG DISEASE IN WORKERS WHO USE 
OR MAKE FLAVORINGS, supra note 9. 
48 Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 
(1980). 
49 Id. at 646. 
50 Testimony of Margaret Seminario before the House Committee on 
Employment and Education, Subcommittee on Workforce Protection on 
OSHA’s Standard Setting Process (June 14, 2001) (on file with authors); NAT’L 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO OSHA’S STANDARDS 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (June 6, 2000) [hereinafter REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO OSHA’S STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS]. 
51 OSHA has comprehensive health standards for the following 25 
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with exposure to various substances is difficult and often involves 
extrapolating from high to low doses, and from animals to humans. 
Recognizing this reality, the Supreme Court explained that it was 
not the Court’s intention to place OSHA in a “mathematical 
straitjacket.”52 Consequently, it permitted the agency significant 
flexibility in quantifying health risks.53 
Arguably, a risk assessment addressing workers’ exposure to 
butter flavoring is less complex than one for a carcinogen because 
it relates to a disease with rapid onset and a clear range of 
disabling respiratory effects. An OSHA regulation to protect 
workers from adverse health effects related to exposure to butter 
flavoring could take one of at least two different approaches. One 
approach would be for OSHA to regulate popcorn manufacturing 
plants and prevent workers’ exposure to all butter flavoring vapors 
until more is known about the cause or causes of the lung disease 
in popcorn workers. A regulation of this form would protect 
popcorn workers from exposure to all potentially hazardous 
chemicals, including diacetyl. In 1976, OSHA embraced this 
approach in developing a standard to protect workers from coke 
oven emissions by requiring reductions in exposure to coal tar 
pitch volatiles rather than attempting to identify the precise cancer-
causing agent in the coke oven emissions.54 Notably, if diacetyl is 
                                                          
substances that are designated by IARC as “known human” or “reasonably 
anticipated to be” carcinogens: asbestos; 3,3 dichlorobenzidine; chloromethyl 
methyl ether; ethyleneimine; bis(chloromethyliether); aminodiphenyl; alpha-
naphthylamine; N-nitrosodimethyl amine; beta-naphthylamine; 4-nitrobiphenyl; 
benzidine; 4-dimethylaminoazobenzene; 2-acetylaminoflourene; beta-
propiolactone; coke-oven emissions; vinyl chloride; arsenic; benzene; 
acrylonitrile; formaldehyde; 4,4-methylenedianiline; cadmium; 1,3 butadiene; 
and methylene chloride. Other health standards issued by OSHA (i.e., cotton 
dust, lead, DBCP, and bloodborne pathogens) were designed primarily to protect 
workers from non-cancer health effects. 
52 Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 448 U.S. at 655. 
53 See id. 
54 Final Rule on Exposure to Coke Oven Emissions, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742 
(Oct. 22, 1976). At the time, there was considerable evidence that workers 
exposed to coke oven emissions and employed in certain tasks (i.e., “topside 
occupations”) had an increased risk of lung cancer. What was unknown, 
however, was which specific component of the emission caused the cancer. 
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the actual cause of the lung disease detected in popcorn workers, 
this approach would leave diacetyl-exposed workers in other 
industries unprotected. 
Alternately, OSHA could issue a standard to regulate workers’ 
exposure to diacetyl. There is powerful evidence to suggest that 
diacetyl has played a causal role in the development of 
bronchiolitis obliterans in workers at facilities other than 
microwave popcorn factories.55 However, there have been no 
studies of workers exposed only to diacetyl, given that the 
chemical is only one (albeit often the primary) component of the 
flavoring mixtures to which the sick workers were exposed. 
Importantly, it is not uncommon for human evidence concerning 
the effects of environmental exposures to be limited or to contain 
uncertainties. In many industrial workplaces, there can be 
hundreds, if not thousands, of chemicals in the work environment. 
It is often impossible to identify the effects of any individual 
hazardous exposure. For obvious ethical reasons, additional 
information cannot be gathered using experiments that involve 
volunteer human subjects. Consequently, regulators generally look 
to animal evidence for additional information on the toxic effects 
of exposure. The BASF study demonstrated that laboratory 
animals exposed to pure diacetyl developed lung disease after short 
exposure.56 In NIOSH’s laboratory investigation, rats exposed to 
butter flavoring whose predominant component was diacetyl 
experienced a similar fate.57 While diacetyl manufacturers are 
likely to claim (as they did in Mr. Peoples’s suit) that there is 
legitimate scientific debate about the health effects of exposure to 
                                                          
OSHA suspected the excess cancer risk was related to workers’ exposure to 
benzo(a)pyrene or other polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons. In the absence of 
unequivocal evidence on the exact cancer-causing component, OSHA proposed 
a regulation to reduce coal tar pitch volatiles as the surrogate measure for coke 
oven emissions. Id. 
55 See NIOSH ALERT: PREVENTING LUNG DISEASE IN WORKERS WHO USE 
OR MAKE FLAVORINGS, supra note 9. There have been outbreaks of severe lung 
disease at several facilities in which diacetyl is an important component of the 
mixture of chemicals to which workers in the factory are exposed, including at 
least two factories which do not produce butter-flavored popcorn. Id. 
56 See BASF REPORT, supra note 20. 
57 See Hubbs, supra note 15. 
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this chemical, there is already a significant body of evidence 
suggesting that diacetyl exposure causes disease.58 Further, there is 
no evidence that diacetyl is not the cause of bronchiolitis 
obliterans. Thus, a public health approach would support severely 
restricting airborne exposure to diacetyl unless and until it is 
shown to be safe. 
Unfortunately, the likelihood of OSHA taking either of these 
regulatory paths is small. It appears to make little difference 
whether the White House is in Democratic or Republican hands. 
The fact remains that new workplace health standards are rare. In 
the last ten years, OSHA has issued standards for a total of two 
new chemicals.59 Indeed, since its inception, OSHA has issued 
comprehensive standards for only thirty toxic materials.60 
Additionally, the agency enforces permissible exposure limits for 
only about 500 chemicals of the more than 12,000 chemicals 
characterized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
as high volume chemicals.61 Of these 500 standards, all but a 
handful were borrowed in whole from the voluntary industry levels 
established prior to OSHA’s creation in 1971. 
With respect to chemicals such as those to which Mr. Peoples 
was exposed, the Flavor and Extract Manufacturers Association of 
                                                          
58 NIOSH INVESTIGATION OF GILSTER MARY LEE, supra note 10, at 4; 
Fixed Obstructive Lung Disease in Workers at a Microwave Popcorn Factory-
Missouri 2000-2002, 51 Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report 345, 345-47 
(Apr. 26, 2002); Kreiss et al., supra note 21. 
59 See Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,746, 
56,856 (Nov. 4, 1996) (to be codified at 29 CFR pts. 1910, 1915 and 1926); see 
also Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 62 Fed. Reg. 1494, 1619 
(Jan. 10, 1997) (to be codified at 29 CFR pts. 1910, 1915 and 1926). 
60 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO OSHA’S STANDARDS 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, supra note 50. This report included a list of OSHA 
Health Standards issued and the date each standard was originally published: 
asbestos (1972/1986); 13 carcinogens (1974); vinyl chloride (1974); coke oven 
emissions (1974); benzene (1978/1987); DBCP (1978); arsenic (1978); cotton 
dust (1978); acrylonitrile (1978); lead (1978); ethylene oxide (1984); 
formaldehyde (1987); chemical exposure in laboratories (1990); bloodborne 
pathogens (1991); 4,4’ methylenedianiline (1992); cadmium (1992); 1,3 
butadiene (1996); methylene chloride (1997). Id. 
61 “High volume” means that more than 1 million pounds of the chemical is 
produced annually. 
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the United States estimates that 1,037 flavoring ingredients pose 
potential respiratory hazards to workers.62 However, workplace 
exposure limits have been established for fewer than 5% of them.63 
B. OSHA’s Response to the Popcorn Lung Outbreak 
When faced with a hazard for which no standard has been set, 
OSHA has the authority to issue an emergency temporary standard 
or to invoke the “general duty clause.”64 OSHA selected neither of 
these options in approaching the prevention of lung disease among 
the popcorn workers. Despite significant “bodies in the morgue” 
evidence, OSHA maintains that “a cause-effect relationship 
between diacetyl and bronchiolitis obliterans has not been 
established, as food-processing workers with this lung disease 
were also exposed to other flavoring agents.”65 
In lieu of industry regulation, OSHA elected to sign a 
“partnership agreement” in September 2002 with The Popcorn 
Board to “help foster a culture of prevention.”66 This move is part 
of a greater effort by OSHA to form alliances with corporations, 
trade associations, and other organizations to voluntarily develop 
and share information regarding worker health and safety. OSHA’s 
Assistant Secretary reported in February 2004 that the agency had 
forty-six national alliances and 105 regional alliances.67 There are 
                                                          
62 See NIOSH ALERT: PREVENTING LUNG DISEASE IN WORKERS WHO USE 
OR MAKE FLAVORINGS, supra note 9. 
63 Id. 
64 OSHA Act §§ 5(a)(1) & 6(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 654, 655 (2004). 
65 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Safety/Health Topics, 
Chemical Sampling Information, Diacetyl, at http://www.osha.gov/dts/ 
chemicalsampling/data/CH_231710.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2005). 
66 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Cooperative Programs, 
Alliance, Regional Alliances and State Plans, Region VII, Agreement 
Establishing an Alliance between the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration U.S. Department of Labor Region VII and The Popcorn Board 
(Sept. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Alliance Agreement], at http://www.osha.gov/ 
dcsp/alliances/regional/reg7/popcorn.html. 
67 Testimony of John Henshaw, Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health, before the United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Appropriations (Feb. 26, 2004), available at 
MICHAELS MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC 3/7/2005 2:51 PM 
30 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
no specific requirements for forming an alliance with OSHA and, 
by design, the agreements lack an enforcement component.68 
According to OSHA’s 2002 alliance agreement with The Popcorn 
Board, the two entities would work cooperatively to develop an 
internal document to be sent to OSHA field compliance officers.69 
Nearly two years later, the hazard bulletin that supposedly would 
help OSHA inspectors understand the butter flavor hazard and 
conduct effective inspections has not been issued.70 
Unfortunately, no other federal agency shares in OSHA’s 
authority to address workplace hazards. Under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), chemical manufacturers are 
required to test their products to determine whether they pose a 
“significant risk of serious or widespread harm to human beings.”71 
If such a risk exists, the EPA can take action to prevent or reduce 
the risk. Diacetyl, the suspect hazard in butter flavoring, is a food 
additive and therefore is explicitly exempt from TSCA. 
Furthermore, relying on the TSCA to protect the public from 
                                                          
http://appropriations.house.gov/_files/JohnHenshawtestimony.pdf. 
68 Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Alliance: An OSHA 
Cooperative Program, at http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/alliances/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2005). 
69 See Alliance Agreement, supra note 66, which reads: “Representatives of 
The Popcorn Board will review and provide comment and input on a draft 
OSHA ‘Hazard Information Bulletin’ to be developed by OSHA for internal 
distribution to it’s [sic] compliance officers in the field.” 
70 Letter from Charles Adkins, OSHA Regional Administrator, to David 
Michaels, George Washington University (June 4, 2004) (on file with authors). 
The letter responded to a FOIA request and reported: “The Hazard Information 
Bulletin referenced in the Alliance is still under review at the OSHA National 
Office.” Id. 
71 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (2005).  
(f) Required actions: 
Upon the receipt of any test data . . . or any other information available 
to the Administrator which indicates . . . that . . . a chemical substance 
or mixture presents or will present a significant risk of serious or 
widespread harm to human beings from cancer, gene mutations, or 
birth defects, the Administrator shall, within the 180-day period . . . 
initiate appropriate action . . . . 
Id. 
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chemical hazards is unlikely to be successful. Indeed, Congress’s 
General Accounting Office (now known as the Government 
Accountability Office) reported that only four chemicals were 
restricted under TSCA in the period between 1976, when the Act 
became law, and 1994, when the study was carried out.72 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is similarly limited 
in its ability to address potential workplace hazards. Although the 
FDA is charged with ensuring “the safety of the nation’s 
domestically-produced and imported foods,”73 because the FDA 
has concluded that diacetyl is “generally recognized as safe . . . as 
a direct food ingredient,” the FDA has satisfied its statutory 
mandate.74 That is, diacetyl is safe for humans to consume; 
however, the FDA makes no attempt to determine whether diacetyl 
is safe for workers to inhale. 
Given the inability or unwillingness of the nation’s regulatory 
apparatus to address workplace hazards, litigation by Mr. Peoples 
and similarly situated popcorn workers is a logical alternative. In 
fact, it may be the only means of compelling employers to protect 
their workers. 
III. REAL AND MANUFACTURED SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY IN THE 
REGULATORY PROCESS: AN INVITATION TO INACTION 
There are few scientific challenges more complex than 
understanding the cause of disease in humans. Scientists cannot 
feed people toxic chemicals, for example, to see what doses cause 
cancer. Instead, investigators must harness the outcomes of 
“natural experiments” in which exposures have already occurred. 
In laboratories, by contrast, scientists design and control 
experiments on animals to determine the impact of toxic agents on 
                                                          
72 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NUMBER GAO/T-RCED-94-
212, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: EPA’S LIMITED PROGRESS IN 
REGULATING TOXIC CHEMICALS (1994). 
73 U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Overview of the Center for Food Safety 
and Applied Nutrition, at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/cfsan4.html (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2005). 
74 Listing of Specific Substances Affirmed as GRAS (Generally 
Recognized as Safe), 21 C.F.R. § 184.1278 (2005). 
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these subjects. Both epidemiologic and laboratory studies involve 
uncertainty and require scientists to extrapolate from study-specific 
evidence to make causal inferences and recommend protective 
measures. 
Much of the public discussion (or controversy) surrounding 
public health and the environmental regulation of chemicals 
focuses on the acceptability of existing exposures. Policymakers 
recognize that uncertainty is inevitable in human risk assessment. 
However, as Christine Todd Whitman, former administrator of the 
EPA, points out, “the absence of certainty is not an excuse to do 
nothing.”75 Generally, if a federal regulatory agency finds that 
exposures are contributing to or are likely to contribute to disease, 
polluters or others responsible for the exposure will be required to 
devote resources to ameliorating the problem. When the prospect 
of regulation is associated with substantial costs, a debate about the 
underlying science ensues, typically focusing on the question of 
scientific certainty. 
Absolute certainty in the regulatory sciences is rare. Yet there 
is a growing trend in regulatory agencies that demands proof over 
precaution in the realm of public health and the environment. By 
way of example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
recently announced that it would permit the re-opening of the 
Davis-Besse nuclear reactor near Toledo, Ohio.76 Two years 
earlier, the facility had come within a quarter-inch of a major 
radiation release, possibly the worst accident of this kind in U.S. 
history. A mixture of water and boric acid had eaten through six 
inches of carbon steel, leaving only a thin layer of stainless steel to 
contain the water in the Davis-Besse nuclear reactor’s vessel 
head.77 When the facility was finally inspected, the last steel layer 
                                                          
75 Christine Todd Whitman, Remarks on “Effective Policy Making: The 
Role of Good Science” at the National Academy of Science’s Symposium on 
Nutrient Over-Enrichment of Coastal Waters (Oct. 13, 2000), at 
http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_01/alia/a0010407.htm. 
76 Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear Plant, Closed After Corrosion, Will Reopen, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at A16. 
77 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-04-415, NUCLEAR 
REGULATION: NRC NEEDS TO MORE AGGRESSIVELY AND COMPREHENSIVELY 
RESOLVE ISSUES RELATED TO THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT’S 
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was bulging, barely able to contain the highly-pressurized 
coolant.78 
Three months prior to NRC’s inspection, NRC experts 
predicted cooling system breaches at the Ohio plant following the 
discovery of cracks in two similar nuclear reactors.79 The agency 
asked the operators of all similar reactors to close voluntarily for 
inspection.80 Davis-Besse’s operator refused and NRC staff 
prepared an order demanding the closure and inspection of the 
reactor. The order was never issued, however, because the NRC 
supervisor demanded “absolute proof” that the vessel head was 
damaged before he would authorize a facility shutdown.81 
Problematically, this proof could only be obtained through a post-
shutdown inspection. 
                                                          
SHUTDOWN 1 (2004). 
78 See Memorandum from Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, to Richard A. Meserve, Former Chairman, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, on “NRC’s Regulation of Davis-Besse 
Regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head (Case No. 02-03S)” 17 (Dec. 30, 
2002) (“The remaining thickness of the RPV head in the wastage area was found 
to be approximately 3/8 inch . . . .”), available at www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/doc-
collections/insp-gen/2003/02-03s.pdf; Memorandum from Hubert T. Bell, 
Inspector General, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to Nils J. Diaz, 
Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, on “NRC’s Oversight of 
Davis-Besse Boric Acid Leakage and Corrosion during the April 2000 Refueling 
Outage (Case No. 03-02s)” 6 (Oct. 17, 2003); 16 N.R.C. INSPECTOR GENERAL 
SEMIANNUAL REP. NO. 2 (Oct. 1, 2003 – Mar. 31, 2004) (“This was the only 
material preventing a breach of the reactor coolant pressure boundary . . . .”), 
available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1415/ 
v16n2/. 
79 Memorandum from Hubert T. Bell to Richard A. Meserve, supra note 
78, at 6. 
80 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT NO. GAO-04-415, 
NUCLEAR REGULATION: NRC NEEDS TO MORE AGGRESSIVELY AND 
COMPREHENSIVELY RESOLVE ISSUES RELATED TO THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR 
POWER PLANT’S SHUTDOWN 2 (2004). 
81 Id. at 34. 
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IV. “DOUBT IS OUR PRODUCT”82 
The production and use of scientific data in public policy has 
become an adversarial endeavor with unfortunate results both for 
science and society. An entire industry has emerged to lend 
support to the generic assertion, made with great frequency by 
opponents of regulation, that science is uncertain and that 
regulation cannot proceed until more conclusive data are collected. 
This industry specializes in magnifying and manufacturing 
uncertainty about the science supporting public health regulation. 
The tobacco industry has perfected the strategy. For nearly fifty 
years, tobacco companies hired scientists to disprove that smokers 
were at a greater risk of dying of lung cancer, heart disease, and 
other tobacco-related illnesses than were nonsmokers.83 The 
industry also hired scientists to refute evidence that environmental 
tobacco smoke increased disease risk in nonsmokers.84 In each 
case, the scientific community eventually reached the consensus 
that tobacco smoke caused the studied medical conditions.85 In 
                                                          
82 Brown & Williamson, supra note 1. 
83 The tobacco industry’s strategy for casting doubt on the adverse health 
effects of their product has been documented by numerous researchers including 
RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE 
WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 
(1996); STANTON A. GLANTZ, JOHN SLADE, ET AL., CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996); 
DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A 
DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001). 
84 KLUGER, supra note 83; GLANTZ, supra note 83; KESSLER, supra note 
83. 
85 OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, NO. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERVICE (1964), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/ 
sgr_1964/1964%20SGR%20Intro.pdf; Office on Smoking and Health, U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, DHEW Publication No. 79-
50066, Smoking and Health: A Report of the Surgeon General (1979), at 
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/; National Research Council, Environmental 
Tobacco Smoke: Measuring Exposures and Assessing Health Effects (1986); 
OFFICE OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT NO. EPA/600/6-90/006F, RESPIRATORY HEALTH 
EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992); 
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spite of overwhelming scientific evidence and the smoking-related 
deaths of millions of people, the tobacco industry waged a 
campaign that successfully delayed regulation and victim 
compensation for decades. 
Among other tools used by the tobacco industry to manufacture 
scientific uncertainty was the journal Tobacco and Health 
Research, a publication aimed at physicians and scientists. The 
journal’s criteria for selecting articles are telling: “the most 
important type of story is that which casts doubt on the cause and 
effect theory of disease and smoking.”86 The journal’s public 
relations firm, Hill and Knowlton, advised that headlines “should 
strongly call out the point—Controversy! Contradiction! Other 
Factors! Unknowns!”87 The same message was communicated to 
the public. One tobacco industry executive explained: “Doubt is 
our product since it is the best means of competing with the ‘body 
of fact’ that exists in the minds of the general public. It is also the 
means of establishing a controversy.”88 
The manufacture of doubt has become so commonplace that it 
now is unusual for the science behind an environmental regulation 
to remain unchallenged. The National Toxicology Program, for 
example, biannually issues a list of substances that can cause 
cancer.89 Before a new substance can be designated a carcinogen, it 
must be subjected to a public process involving several 
independent scientific reviews. During this process, industry-
employed scientists have challenged the designation of various 
substances as “cancer-causing” and have disputed the evidence 
underlying the assignment of this designation to alcoholic 
                                                          
Richard Doll et al., Mortality in relation to smoking: 50 years’ observations on 
male British doctors, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 1519, 1519 (2004). 
86 Memorandum from Carl Thompson, Vice President, Hill & Knowlton, 
Inc., to William Kloepfer, Jr., Vice President, The Tobacco Institute, Inc. (Oct. 
18, 1968), available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/ti/TIMN0071488-
1491.html#footnote_4. 
87 Id. 
88 Brown & Williamson, supra note 1. 
89 NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, TENTH REPORT ON CARCINOGENS (2002), available at 
http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/roc/toc10.html. 
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beverages,90 beryllium,91 crystalline silica,92 ethylene oxide,93 
nickel compounds,94 and certain wood dusts.95 In each of these 
cases, the examined substance had already been categorized by the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer as “carcinogenic to 
humans.”96 
Debates regarding the validity of science persist, even in the 
face of powerful evidence. Within the scientific community, for 
example, there is strong consensus that broad-spectrum ultraviolet 
                                                          
90 See William Waddell, Public comment as reported in the Report of 
Carcinogens Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of 
Scientific Counselors (Dec. 2-3, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov. 
91 H. Daniel Roth, Public comment as reported in the Report of 
Carcinogens Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of 
Scientific Counselors (Jan. 20-21, 2000), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov; 
Dimitrios Trichopoulos, Public comment as reported in the Report of 
Carcinogens Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of 
Scientific Counselors (Jan. 20-21, 2000), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov. 
92 Robert Glenn, Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens 
Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific 
Counselors (Dec. 2-3, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov; William 
Moll, Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens Subcommittee 
Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific Counselors (Dec. 2-
3, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov. 
93 Julian Preston, Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens 
Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific 
Counselors (Dec. 2-3, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov; M. Jane Teta, 
Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens Subcommittee 
Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific Counselors (Dec. 2-
3, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov; Sara Schotland, Public comment 
as reported in the Report of Carcinogens Subcommittee Meeting, National 
Toxicology Program Board of Scientific Counselors (Dec. 2-3, 1998), available 
at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov. 
94 Adriana Oller, Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens 
Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific 
Counselors (Dec. 2-3, 1998), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov. 
95 William Blot, Public comment as reported in the Report of Carcinogens 
Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific 
Counselors (Dec. 13-15, 2000), available at http://ntp.niehs.nih.gov. 
96 International Agency for Research on Cancer, Overall Evaluations of 
Carcinogenicity to Humans, available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/monoeval/ 
crthgr01.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
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(UV) radiation from sunlight and tanning lamps causes skin 
cancer. Regardless, the trade association that represents tanning 
salons has continued to question the scientific evidence that 
supports UV radiation’s designation as a carcinogen. 97 
Similarly, opponents of OSHA regulation have disputed many 
of the health standards proposed by the agency.98 For example, 
when OSHA first proposed to regulate exposure to cotton dust, the 
cause of a serious lung disease among textile workers, the textile 
industry asserted a number of claims in order to halt or delay 
regulation.99 The industry argued that the lung disease, known as 
byssinosis, was not a true clinical entity and that additional 
research was required to identify the exact portion of the cotton 
plant that caused the respiratory problem.100 OSHA considered all 
                                                          
97 Stephen Ross, Public comment, as reported in the Report of Carcinogens 
Subcommittee Meeting, National Toxicology Program Board of Scientific 
Counselors (December 13-15, 2000), available at http://ntp.niehs. 
nih.gov/ntp.htdocs/Liason/121300.pdf. 
98 Section 6(f) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 allows 
“any person who may be adversely affected by a standard . . . [to] file a petition 
challenging the validity of such standard with the United States court of 
appeals . . . .” OSHA Act § (6)(f), 29 U.S.C. 655 (2005). See Color Pigments 
Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. OSHA, 16 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing OSHA’s 
cadmium standard); Am. Dental Ass’n v. Secretary of Labor, 984 F.2d 823 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (discussing OSHA’s bloodborne pathogens standard); Am. Petroleum 
Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing OSHA’s benzene 
standard); Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (discussing 
OSHA’s coke oven emissions standard); Am. Soc’y for the Plastics Indus. v. 
OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing OSHA’s vinyl chloride 
standard); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d 
Cir. 1974) (discussing OSHA’s 14 carcinogens); United Auto Workers v. 
Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (discussing OSHA’s formaldehyde 
standard); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (discussing OSHA’s lead standard); AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing OSHA’s cotton dust standard); Indus. Union Dep’t 
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing OSHA’s asbestos 
standard). 
99 Proposed Health Standard on Cotton Dust, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,498 (Dec. 28, 
1976). 
100 See Statement of M.C. Battigelli, M.D., before the Public Hearing 
Concerning the Proposed Change in the OSHA Cotton Dust Standard (Apr. 1, 
1977) (on file with authors); see also Statement of W.K.C. Morgan, M.D., West 
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of the available scientific evidence and proceeded with its 
regulation. Today, byssinosis has been virtually eliminated in the 
United States—an unqualified public health success.101 
Unfortunately, the strategy of creating uncertainty regarding 
the risks associated with pharmaceutical use, chemical exposure, 
and the use of hazardous products, has been remarkably successful. 
By raising the cry of “junk science” and questioning the validity or 
strength of scientific evidence, polluters and manufacturers of 
dangerous products have been able to delay, often for decades, 
regulations and other measures designed to protect the health and 
safety of individuals and communities. This strategy, which has 
been readily employed by the textile industry and tobacco 
manufacturers, has been embraced by many industries facing new 
regulation. Through the promotion of the “junk science” 
movement, polluters and manufacturers have sought to influence 
public opinion by ridiculing scientists whose research presents an 
economic threat, irrespective of the quality of the scientists’ 
research. Further, industries facing regulation frequently challenge 
the scientific studies (and even scientific methods) used in the 
regulatory and legal arenas as fundamentally flawed, contradictory, 
or incomplete. Thus, they assert, it would be unfair or premature to 
regulate the exposure in question or to compensate the worker or 
community resident who may have been made sick by the 
exposure. 
V. DOUBT, SCIENCE AND THE COURTS 
The influence of “junk science” arguments on the judiciary is 
                                                          
Virginia University School of Medicine, before the Public Hearing Concerning 
the Proposed Change in the OSHA Cotton Dust Standard (on file with authors); 
Statement of Jack W. Whitworth, M.D., American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute, Inc., before the Public Hearing Concerning the Proposed Change in the 
OSHA Cotton Dust Standard (on file with authors). 
101 See NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUBLICATION NO. 2003-111, THE WORK-
RELATED LUNG DISEASE SURVEILLANCE REPORT (2002); see also Regulatory 
Review of OSHA’s Cotton Dust Standard, 65 Fed. Reg. 76667-01 (2000) 
(noting that the prevalence of byssinosis among cotton textile workers declined 
from 20% in the 1970’s to 0.68% in 2000). 
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clear. In recent years, courts have come to worship scientific 
certainty. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., federal judges have had an 
obligation to serve as scientific gatekeepers, allowing into 
evidence only expert testimony that meets specific standards for 
relevance and reliability.102 In fact, a recent study found that courts 
are now asking doctors who testify as experts to meet standards 
that exceed those that the doctors use to diagnose and treat their 
own patients.103 
The influence of the Daubert decision is evident in the 
litigation regarding the harmful effects of Parlodel, a drug 
prescribed in the early 1990s to stop postpartum lactation.104 Until 
it was withdrawn from the market, a number of young women who 
had been prescribed Parlodel experienced severe circulatory 
system episodes, such as heart attacks and strokes, shortly after 
taking the drug.105 On the basis of case reports and animal studies, 
in 1985, the FDA requested that the drug’s manufacturer include 
warnings about hypertension, seizure, and stroke on the drug’s 
label.106 Evidence continued to accumulate and the FDA’s concern 
became so great that, in 1994, it requested that Parlodel’s 
manufacturer stop selling the drug to lactating women.107 
However, when several women sued the drug’s manufacturer, 
claiming that Parlodel was responsible for their illnesses, their 
cases were thrown out of court for lack of scientific certainty.108 
Similarly, judges in several jurisdictions refused to allow jurors to 
consider the testimony of scientists or physicians who opined that 
                                                          
102 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
103 Jerome P. Kassirer & Joe S. Cecil, Inconsistency in Evidentiary 
Standards for Medical Testimony: Disorder in the Courts, 288 JAMA 1382, 
1382-87 (2002). 
104 Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought? AM. J. 
OF PUB. HEALTH (forthcoming 2005). 
105 See Kassirer & Cecil, supra note 103. 
106 Opportunity for a Hearing on a Proposal to Withdraw Approval of the 
Indication, 59 Fed. Reg. 43347-01, 43347-43348 (Aug 23, 1994). 
107 Id. at 43347. 
108 See Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 
2000); Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). 
MICHAELS MACROED FINAL 2-18-05.DOC 3/7/2005 2:51 PM 
40 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Parlodel could cause circulatory disorders.109 
Applying the Daubert rule, these judges demanded a level of 
certainty that was virtually impossible to provide. Some experts 
have suggested that the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision or, 
more appropriately, some judges’ interpretation of Daubert, 
encourages an anti-scientific method for evaluating scientific 
evidence.110 In contrast to the weight-of-the-evidence approach 
employed by scientists, this method requires that each piece of 
scientific data be evaluated independently for relevance and 
reliability—an approach University of Texas law professor 
Thomas O. McGarity refers to as “corpuscular.”111 
Opponents of workplace safety and environmental regulation 
are seeking to institutionalize this anti-scientific approach in 
federal agencies. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, 
advocates the application of the “Daubert criteria” to regulatory 
proceedings.112 However, this corpuscular approach is problematic 
when applied to the determination of causation in individual tort 
cases, and it is both counterproductive and dangerous when applied 
to the scientific evidence that forms the basis of public health 
regulations. Since its inception, OSHA has used a weight-of-the-
evidence approach to demonstrate the necessity of protective 
action and to craft health standards that have ultimately proved 
successful in reducing hazardous exposures. OSHA’s early health 
standards were not based on perfect scientific information; 
nonetheless, the weight of the evidence was sufficient to support 
                                                          
109 See Kassirer & Cecil, supra note 103, at 1387. 
110 Carl Cranor, Scientific Inference in the Laboratory and the Law, AM. J. 
OF PUB. HEALTH (forthcoming 2005); Sheldon Krimsky, The “Weight-of-
Scientific-Evidence” in Policy & Law, AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH (forthcoming 
2005); Ronald Melnick, A Daubert Motion: A Legal Strategy to Exclude 
Essential Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 
(forthcoming 2005). 
111 Thomas O. McGarity, Science In The Regulatory Process: On the 
Prospect of Daubertizing Judicial Review of Risk Assessment, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 155 (2003). 
112 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Scientific Information in Federal 
Rulemaking, available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/index/regulatory/ 
scientific_rulemaking.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005). 
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the issuance of protective regulations that have saved lives.113 
Given OSHA’s reluctance to issue new occupational health 
standards, litigation pursued by injured workers is likely to play an 
increasingly important role in eliminating or reducing workplace 
hazards, and in preventing occupational illness and death. Despite 
the above evidentiary limitations, litigation remains a viable and 
valuable avenue for workers seeking to hold employers 
accountable for their failure to ensure workplace health and safety. 
While the damage has already been done to Mr. Peoples’s 
lungs and to the lungs of other popcorn workers, the $20 million 
verdict in Mr. Peoples’s case is likely to compel manufacturers and 
employers to ensure that workers are provided adequate protection. 
Perhaps it will even encourage the food industry to develop a way 
to make butter-flavored microwave popcorn without endangering 
the lives of workers. 
 
                                                          
113 David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Manufacturing Uncertainty: 
Contested Science and the Protection of the Public’s Health and Environment. 
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